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NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS v. FINLEY:
Challenging the Facial Challenge
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal government has long subsidized many of
America's greatest treasures. Art is one of the primary beneficiaries of that funding. American culture has in many ways developed pursuant to organizations, programs, and interest groups
sponsored through federal funds. Without these funds many valuable programs would dissolve and the innovations that shape our
society would be lost. As to be expected, the question of what to
subsidize and the conditions placed thereon has troubled the
American people, Congress and the Courts. The Supreme Court
has struggled with the question of, "How free is speech when the
government pays?"' Thus far, the Court has failed to provide a
clear answer.
The gamut of government subsidized speech is too diverse to
define one unified theory on how the government can control it.
Art speech, subsidized by the government, must meet standards
accepted by and representative of American values.2 The current
members of the Supreme Court confronted a recent challenge
regarding the constitutionality of this provision.' The major issue
before the Court was whether the government may control the
content of art produced by artists receiving federal grants. The
case arose from a facial challenge to a 1990 congressional amendment, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1). Applying the standards of
a facial challenge, the Court dissected the advisory language guiding discretionary funding decisions. 4 The advisory language was
held constitutional on its face, however Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, implied that the provision will be narrowed if, on
a case-by-case basis, a court finds unconstitutional applications. 5
Art is an institution that models American freedoms and, "gradu1. Eugene Volokh, How Free Is Speech When the Government Pays?, WALL
ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A18.

2. 28 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990).
3. National Endowment for the Arts v. Karen Finley, '118 S.Ct. 2168, 141
L.Ed.2d 500 (1998).
4. Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion states, "The operation was a
success, but the patient died." Id. at 2180.
5. Id. at 2178.
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ally cutting away the unconstitutional aspects of the statute by
invalidating its improper applications case by case ... does not
respond sufficiently to the peculiarly vulnerable character of activities protected by the First Amendment."6 Indeed this leaves freedom of artistic expression and speech in a compromising position,
but until a satisfactory solution exists the problem is only amenable to as-applied adjudication.7
This Note examines the facial challenge in National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") v. Finley 8 and how an as-applied challenge may have produced a different outcome. In particular, this
Note will analyze the inadequacy of a facial challenge to the
"decency & respect" provision,9 and in the alternative how an asapplied challenge would have invalidated the provision when
applied to artists such as the Respondents in Finley. In Part One,
the majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor is reviewed.
Part Two discusses the standards in which statutes may be constitutionally challenged: facial and as-applied. In Part Three, the
facial challenge in Finley is contrasted against the standard of an
as-applied challenge. Finally, Part Four demonstrates how in contrast to the facial challenge, the application of amended
§ 954(d)(1)1 ° will have unconstitutional results. The Supreme
Court was correct in addressing the facial challenge. However,
when the standards of an as-applied challenge are utilized, it is
unequivocally clear that the statute compromises the very purposes and foundations on which Congress founded the NEA. Congress intended to promote artistic excellence, not to impose
governmental control of the arts when it created the NEA.'1

6.

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw 1023 (2d ed. 1988).
7. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 202 (The Foundation Press
1989).
8. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168
9. 28 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990).
10. Id.
11. "Congress has clearly indicated the NEA's purpose is to support a diverse
array of artistic expression. Even the most cursory review of the NEA's enabling
statute reveals this intent. In it's findings, Congress emphasized that a
democracy must 'honor and preserve its multi-cultural artistic heritage as well
as support new ideas' and declared its intent 'to help create and sustain ... a
climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry'." Finley v.
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d. 671, 681 (1996) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 951
(10), (7) (1965)).
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II.

NEA

V. FINLEY-THE CASE

The current members of the Supreme Court have struggled
with the issue of federal funding on a case by case basis, leaving
narrow guidelines and no solutions to the problem of government
control over the speech it subsidizes. 1 2 The question of how free is
speech when the government pays has been raised at the post
office, the park, streets, universities, but never in the context of a
discretionary institution.1 3 The Finley Court confronted a new
hurdle in the line of patronage cases: the impact advisory language has on funding decisions. The issue before the Finley Court
was whether the advisory language of § 954(d)(1), on its face,
guaranteeing freedom of
interferes with First Amendment rights
14
art.
through
expression
and
speech
A.

NEA Background

The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of
1965 authorized the creation of the National Endowment for the
Arts.' 5 The NEA was created as an institution to promote and
foster the arts and humanities.' 6 Open inquiry and experimentation was the original spirit of the NEA and pursuant to such
spirit, the Senate required that "in the administration of this act
there be given the fullest attention to freedom of artistic and
humanistic expression."'" When the Endowment was created,
President Lyndon Johnson emphasized the importance of funding
artistic speech while at the same time limiting government interference.18 In response to this calling, a policy of noninterference
12. Farber, supra note 7, at 202-203.
13. Volokh, supra note 1.
14. "The First Amendment protects works, which taken as a whole, have
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
15. 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1965).
16. Id.
17. A Report to Congress on the National Endowment for the Arts, September
1990; quoted in RICHARD BOLTON, CULTURE WARS XVI (1992).
18. 'We fully recognize that no government can call artistic excellence into
existence. It must flow from the quality of society and the good fortune of the
nation. Nor should any government seek to restrict the freedom of the artist to
pursue his calling in his own way." 111 CONG. REC. 4594 (1965); quoted in
PROJECTS," NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTs,"AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REGARDING NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE CONTENT OF

PROJECTS (19XX).
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was incorporated into the law creating the NEA.19 The law
required that in the administration of the Act, no official or
department of the United States shall exercise any direction,
supervision, or control over the administration or operation. 20 To
insulate art from politics, institutional safeguards such as the unilateral acts of the Chairperson and National Arts Council were
imposed on the decision-making process. 2 ' The Chairperson, who
ultimately makes the final decision, cannot approve funding without first receiving a positive recommendation from the National
Arts Council.2 2 The initial administration of the grant program
made decisions based upon the "artistic merit" of the grant
proposals.2 3
The NEA came under fire in 1989 after federal funds were
issued to assist photography exhibits of Robert Mapplethorpe and
Andres Serrano.2 4 In response to a conservative campaign to deny
grants to dangerous or offensive art, Congress amended § 954(d)
of the Act to include the "decency and respect" consideration at
issue in Finley.25 The amended section now provides:
No payment shall be made under this section except upon
application therefor which is submitted to the National Endowment for the Arts in accordance with regulations issued and procedures established by the Chairperson. In establishing such
regulations and procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure that(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by
which applications are judged, taking into considerationgeneral
standardsof decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values
of the American public 26

The "decency and respect" clause was included as a direct
response to the funding of art expressing viewpoints similar to
19. 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1995).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 953(c) (1965).
21. 20 U.S.C. §§ 955(f), 959(c) (1965).
22. Id.
23. Brief for Karen Finley at 2, NEA v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97371).
24. The controversial work of Robert Mapplethorpe was a photography
exhibit considered to include homoerotic images and Andres Serrano's "Piss
Christ" was considered sacrilegious or blasphemous. See STEVEN C. DUBIN,
ARRESTING IMAGES: IMPOLITIC ART AND UNCIVIL ACTIONS 96-101, 176-179 (1992).
25. Members of Congress noted that amending § 954(d)(1) would prevent the
funding of works similar to Mapplethorpe and Serrano. 136 CONG. REC. H941057 (Oct. 11, 1990).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss1/7
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those expressed by Mapplethorpe and Serrano.2 7 The partisan
clash over federal funding of the arts settled grounds by amending
§ 954(d)(1) to include the "decency and respect" considerations;2"
more importantly without the amended provision conservatives
would have teamed up to abolish the NEA. 2 9 The strong attempt
to insulate the arts from government control began to wear down
and with the amended provision of "decency and respect" the envisioned dangers of government art became a reality. °
B.

Factual Basis and ProceduralHistory

Performance artists Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holy Hughes,
and Tim Miller applied for NEA grants before §954(d)(1) was
enacted. 3 ' After recommended approval of funding from the advi27. Senator Helms, in support of his amendment to prohibit the use of
appropriated funds for the dissemination, promotion, or production of obscene or
indecent materials, stated, "I believe we are all aware of the controversy
surrounding the use of Federal funds, via the [NEA], to support so-called works
of art by Andres Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe. My amendment would
prevent the NEA from funding such immortal trash in the future." 135 CONG.
REC. S8762-01, (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
28. The dispute was whether "Congress should specify categories of art that
could not be funded or instruct NEA to consider general standards of 'decency
and respect' in judging the artistic merit of grant application. Congress settled
on the latter." Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd 118 S.Ct.
2168 (1998).
29. Ironically, the same day the Supreme Court held § 954(d)(1) valid on its
face, the House Appropriations Committee reversed the decision of its
subcommittee to remove funds from the agency. See Jacqueline Trescott, Groups
Shiver at 'Chilling Effect': Plaintiffs Warn of Consequences for Freedom of
Expression, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 26, 1998, at A18.
30. "Government art-art officially sanctioned and inoffensive, totally
apolitical, and capable of pleasing all voters who make a practice of writing their
representatives-is virtually guaranteed to be art that history quickly forgets,
The endowment knew that by attempting the essentially dangerous undertaking
of supporting and encouraging the best the arts had to offer, it was courting
trouble and trouble came . . . " Nicols Fox, NEA Under Siege, NEW ART
EXAMINER, Summer (1989), reprinted in RicHARD BOLTON, CULTURE WAR 48
(1992).
31. Finley, 100 F.3d at 671; The plaintiffs of this case have been nicknamed
the "NEA 4". Their rejected controversial performances are as follows: Karen
Finley's, "We Keep Our Victims Ready," advances her "aggressive feminism".
The performance presents Finley in a multitude of personas, from male to
female and victim to victimizer, while she exhorts tales of violence, sexual abuse,
and racial hatred. Holly Hughes' art advances lesbianism in her monologue
"World Without End". Artist Tim Miller aims to increase awareness and
education of the homosexual community in his performance, "Some Golden
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sory panel and Chairman Frohnmayer, a majority of the Council
disapproved and denied funding to the artists.2 The artists filed
suit against the NEA, alleging violation of First Amendment
rights, failure to follow statutory procedures for selecting grant
applicants, and violation of the Privacy Act of 1974.1' Respondents later amended their complaint after Congress enacted
§954(d)(1) challenging the provision as facially invalid for vagueness and impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 4 The statutory
and as-applied constitutional claims were settled by paying the
artists the amount of vetoed grants, damages, and attorney fees. 5
The District Court then granted summary judgment in favor of
the respondents and enjoined enforcement of §954(d)(1) as unconstitutional. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
holding that § 954(d)(1) was facially invalid as it impermissibly
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint and was void for vagueness under the First and Fifth Amendments. 7 A writ of certiorari
was granted and the Supreme Court reversed.3 The Court held
that § 954(d)(1) is facially valid, it neither interferes with First
Amendment rights nor violates constitutional principles. 39
C.

The Majority Opinion

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court and first
confronted this issue by acknowledging the heavy burden and disfavored view that accompanies a facial constitutional challenge.40
In order to overcome their burden and invalidate §954(d)(1) on its
face, the respondents must demonstrate a "substantial risk that
application of the provision will lead to the suppression of
speech." 4
Gates," that outlines his life as a homosexual and the threat of AIDS. John Fleck
confronts alcoholism and Catholicism in his performance "Blessed Are All the
Little Fishes." See Dubin, supra note 24, at 153.
32. Id.
33. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2174.
34. Id.
35. Id. This Note makes the argument that if the as-applied challenge had
not been settled the Supreme Court would be left with no choice but to strike the
provision down as unconstitutional.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2180.
39. Id. at 2175-2180.
40. Id. at 2175.
41. Id.
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The majority began its analysis on respondents' claim by noting that the plain language of §954(d)(1) merely adds "considerations" when reviewing grant applications.4 2 Focusing on the
NEA's interpretation, the majority concluded that the "decency
and respect" provision is merely hortatory, neither prohibiting nor
denying the benefits of funding to certain categories of speech.4 3
The majority accepted the interpretation of the language as adviacceptance does not extend
sory, but made a point to note that this
44
to matters implementing § 954(d)(1).
The Court then moved from the plain language of the statute
to the political atmosphere surrounding the adoption of
§ 954(d)(1). 45 The legislative intent was to reform procedural
devices rather than to preclude speech.4 6 The Court did not accept
respondents' argument that the "decency and respect" clause
makes it necessary for the NEA to deny funding on the basis of
viewpoint.4 7 The Court reasoned that upon the advice of the
Independent Commission, Congress did not impose isolated
restrictions on funding, but rather incorporated into the selection
process additional criteria for assessing artistic merit.48
It was under this approach to the § 954(d)(1) language as criteria for the selection process that the Court distinguished cases
where legislation has been struck down as facially unconstitutional. The majority compared the discretionary language of
§ 954(d)(1) to provisions that "set forth a clear penalty, proscribed
views on particular 'disfavored subjects,' and suppressed 'ideas
conveyed by a distinctive message.' ' 4 9 Comparing these provisional extremes, the Court could not find the realistic danger evident in a penalizing provision within the advisory language of
§ 954(d)(1) that would compromise First Amendment rights.5 0
The provision has no concrete demands it is merely advisory.
It neither defines the subjective criteria of "decency and respect"
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2176. The Court focuses in on the facial challenge and
makes a point to divert its holding from any application of the statute by refusing
to discuss whether or not the way the NEA implements the provision is in fact a
reasonable reading of the statute.
45. See Dubin, supra at note 24.
46. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2176.
47. Id. at 2176.
48. Id.
49. Id., citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-393 (1992).
50. Id. at 2176
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nor demands the criteria to be utilized. The provision simply
exhorts that the criteria be "taken into consideration" and therefore does not justify facial invalidation.5 1 The Court continued its
pursuit to facially validate § 954(d)(1) by listing permissible applications of the statute, such as funding of educational programs
and symphony orchestras. 2 The Court declined to hypothesize
impermissible applications, 58 but subsequently stated that it was
not persuaded that such applications would give rise to the suppression of protected expression.5 4 The Court left open the issue
of the constitutionality of § 954(d)(1) under an as-applied challenge warning that, "If the NEA were to leverage its power to
award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty
on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different
55
case."
Finally, the Court conceded that the terms of the provision
were vague, but found that the vagueness doctrine had no application to a discretionary provision.5 6 Vagueness concerns are significant in the context of criminal statutes or regulations, "But when
the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the
57
consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe."
Thus, the majority in Finley held that § 954(d)(1) is not on its face
unconstitutional, but rather the advisory language is a consequence of the nature of arts funding.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF A STATUTE:

FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED

Constitutional challenges to a statute are governed by two
standards: facial and as-applied to a particular set of facts.5 8
Although both standards determine whether or not a statute is
51. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2177.
52. Id. at 2177. The rationale behind the Court's attempt to list permissible
applications is to satisfy the "no set of circumstances" test. See U.S. v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
53. Id. at 2177 citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978).
54. Id. This is without merit because the Court did not give itself a chance to
be persuaded that § 954(d)(1) would result in impermissible applications.
55. Id. at 2178.
56. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2179.
57. Id. at 2179.
58. Constitutional cases divide into categories of "facial" and "as-applied"
challenges, and no bright line rule exists for all possible situations of each
category. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
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constitutional, the difference is in the outcome is extreme.59 A
decision that holds a statute unconstitutional on its face has the
effect of invalidating the statute as a whole. 60 On the other hand,
the less extreme result is the decision that holds the statute
unconstitutional as-applied to a particular set of facts. There, the
result is that the statute remains to have permissible applications
and is therefore constitutional on its face.61
The categorizing of constitutional challenges are judge-made
standards to help focus the analysis of a particular statute. Consequently, there are neither set guidelines nor legal standards for
a facial challenge and as a result, the Court's treatment of facial
challenges is often contradictory. One commentator has alluded
that the proper disposition to a facial challenge involves questions
of substantive constitutional law, institutional competence, and
statutory interpretation.6 2 Another theory suggests that the government may abridge protected speech if, on its face, government
action is targeted at suppressing disfavored ideas or if government
action, neutral on its face, was motivated by an intent to single
out constitutionally protected speech for control or penalty.63
Even the Supreme Court developed a "no set of circumstances"
test requiring a facial challenge to fail if the statute has any constitutional application.64 However, the "no set of circumstances"
test was not utilized consistently in subsequent facial challenges.
One traditional principle governing constitutional adjudication is
that constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted
vicariously.65 Nevertheless, a facial challenge is permitted without having to wait for unconstitutional applications. It is "strong
medicine" eliminating the disease that infringes constitutional
rights. 66 "It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only
as a last resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a
59. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (there
the Court utilized both facial and as-applied standards in determining the
validity of a statute).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 235 (1994).
63. Tribe, supra note 6 § 12-2, at 789.
64. Salerno, 418 U.S. 739.
65. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609 (1973).
66. Id. at 612.
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limiting construction has been or could be placed on the chal67
lenged statute."
As a practical matter, facial challenges to statutes are more
difficult to resolve than an as-applied challenge. Facial challenges
consider "whether the statute's overreach is substantial, not only
as an absolute matter, but judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep, and therefore requires consideration of
many more applications than those immediately before the
court." 68 Thus, in order to preserve judicial economy and promote
judicial efficiency, an as-applied challenge should ordinarily be
decided first.6 9
The as-applied challenge, as its name suggests, is determined
on a case-by-case basis. Simply, but broadly stated, an as-applied
challenge will prevail if the implemented statute suppresses disfavored viewpoints or imposes a burden calculated to drive "certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."7 °
A.

Finley's FacialChallenge

A facial challenge to a statute is "the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be
valid."7 1 The standards courts use can significantly affect the success of a constitutional challenge. 72 The Court in Finley, held that
§ 954(d)(1), on its face, was constitutional. 73 Applying the standards of a facial challenge, the Court came to a legally sound
result. However, the very reasons the Court held § 954(d)(1) valid
on its face, creates the inference that a facial challenge was not
the appropriate standard to apply. The advisory character of the
provision raises the presumption that such a statute cannot be
invalid on its face.
The heavy burden that accompanied respondents' facial challenge is the first indicator. The respondents had the burden of
demonstrating a substantial risk that application of § 954(d)(1) by
67. Id.
68. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 485
(1989).
69. Id.
70. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2178, (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))
71. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
72. Id.
73. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2180.
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the agency would lead to the suppression of speech. However, the
provision is toothless. It fails to make demands in the selection
process and merely exhorts that such criteria be "tak[en] into consideration. 7 4 The provision's language falls short of mandatory
application in the grant-making process, the same way an advisory opinion by a court of law is not a binding statement. 75 Therefore the risk of application alone cannot be guaranteed.
Although there are no legal standards or guidelines used in
facial attacks, a primary purpose of such a challenge is to monitor
statutes that prohibit or penalize the expression of particular
views. As the majority recognizes, the challenged provision does
not prohibit the NEA from funding indecent or offensive art,
§ 954(d)(1) merely requires general standards of decency and
diverse beliefs be considered when making the discretionary decisions of what art the agency will fund.7 6
Legislative motive or purpose for § 954(d)(1) evidences a second reason why a facial challenge was the improper course of
action. The majority opinion notes that the legislation was aimed
at reforming the procedures of the granting-making scheme to
reserve funding for art more decent and respectful of American
values than the works of Mapplethorpe and Serrano.7 7 Addition
of the "decency and respect" clause was a procedural move, not
substantive. A basic canon of constitutional adjudication is that
statutes should be construed as constitutional. However another
premises of constitutional adjudication holds that "although this
Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it
against constitutional attacks, it must not .. . . carry this to the
point of perverting the purpose of a statute."" The purpose of
§ 954(d)(1) was to reform procedure in the decision-making process. However, the procedural guidelines, coupled with subjective
criteria for decision-making, are not vulnerable to facial
invalidation.
The procedural aspects of § 954(d)(1) can only be challenged
for unconstitutional applications to particular individuals. The
Court attempts to avoid this problem by assessing permissible
applications of § 954(d)(1). 7 9 It is often considered in a facial chal74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

28 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1993).
Blacks Law Dictionary 54 (6th ed. 1990).
Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2177.
Id. at 2172.
Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961).
Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2177.
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lenge "whether the statute's overreach is substantial, not only as
an absolute matter, but judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep, and therefore requires consideration of many
more applications than those immediately before the court." °
Tipping the scales of possible applications, the Finley court
refused to consider hypothetical applications in reviewing the
facial challenge, while proposing permissible applications of the
provision in applications by educational programs.
The Court agrees that the considerations are susceptible to
multiple interpretations, which only reinforces their advisory content."1 Individual standards of decency and respect vary greatly,
making it impossible to define what is expected from these considerations. The Court purports that "when the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of
imprecision are not constitutionally severe ... In the context of
subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with
clarity."8 2 Recognizing the room for vagueness in provisions that
enforce discretionary decisions indicates the lack of room for a
facial challenge.
B.

The As-applied Challenge

Providing "general standards of decency and respect for
diverse beliefs" to be considered when selecting what the NEA
funds is a permissible government purpose.8 3 Nevertheless, the
Court has claimed, "the existence of a permissible purpose cannot
sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."8 4 The standards of an as-applied challenge would have clearly articulated
impermissible effects. First, an as-applied challenge would provide evidence of how denial of a grant would be the product of
individuous viewpoint discrimination. Second, the provision will
impose financial burdens on artists that find their viewpoints
banned from the marketplace. Finally, when applied to whom it is
relevant, the provision is unconstitutional.

80. Fox, 492 U.S. at 485.
81. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2177.
82. Id. at 2179.
83. Id.
84. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 592 (1983).
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The NEA plans to implement § 954(d)(1)8 5 by providing a
panel that represents a variety of "geographical areas, aesthetic
views, professions, areas of expertise, races and ethnic groups and
gender." 6 The rationale being that because advisory panels were
composed of individuals with diverse backgrounds, the decisions
of these panels would "reflect general standards of decency and
show respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."8 ' However, the advisory panel does not have final power.
The Chairperson, possessing ultimate authority to approve or
deny grants, merely utilizes the advisory panels to review applications.8 8 However, the Chairperson cannot approve any application
disapproved by the National Council. The fact that the President,
with consent of Congress appoints both the Chairperson and
National Council, 9 indicates that the advisory panel is a mask
appearing to insulate art from politics. 90 As a result, denial of
applications will display government hostility towards certain
viewpoints.
In the Court's own words, "even in the provision of subsidies,
the Government may not aim at the suppression of dangerous
ideas, and if a subsidy were "manipulated" to have a "coercive
effect," then relief could be appropriate." 9 1 Conservative politicians have used the NEA debate as a platform to promote traditional American values, which for them is identical to their
personal campaigns: patriotism, profamily, prochurch, and
92
antigay.
While Finley's application was under review, Chairperson
Fronhayer told his staff that the NEA had to live in a "political
world" and to reject some applications to reassure the NEA's con85. The District Court enjoined enforcement of § 954(d)(1), and consequently
the NEA has not applied the provision since June 1992. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at
2174.
86. Id. at 2175.
87. Finley, 100 F.3d at 676.
88. 20 U.S.C. § 955(f) (1990).
89. 20 U.S.C. §§ 954(b)(1), 955(b) (1990).

90. "If the First Amendment requires an extraordinary justification of
government action which is aimed at ideas or information that the government
does not like, the constitutional guarantee should not be avoidable by
government action which seeks to attain the unconstitutional objective under
some other guise." Tribe, supra note 6 § 12-5, at 814.
91. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2178, (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
92. RicHARD
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stituency 9 3 From the Chairperson's comment one can draw the
conclusion that Congress' lingering threats to sever all government support of the arts manipulated and coerced the agency to
deny benefits of funding to art encompassing provocative ideas.
Furthermore, assume that reasons given for the denial were that
the art work was considered not to rise to a level of decency and
respect for diverse beliefs. In its own words, the Court conceded
that the language added "imprecise considerations" but its nature
being advisory did not employ the doctrine of vagueness. 94 However, once applied, the advisory language will violate the principle
that once government chooses to subsidize, it cannot do so in a
manner that rises to a level of vagueness that violates the First
and Fifth Amendment.9 5 Here, the considerations noted in
§ 954(d)(1), when utilized, will result in an inconsistent and vague
standard that effectively precludes expression of particular views.
The government may subsidize speech only if it does so in way
that is viewpoint neutral.9 6 Congress expressed an original intent
that the NEA, an institution embodying freedoms of expression
and speech, receive allocation of funds to "help create and sustain
:. . a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and
inquiry."97 Thus, conditions attached to the expenditure of subsidies is restricted since art falls within the realm of protected
expression that is fundamental to the functioning of a free society. 98 Section 954(d)(1) awards funds on the condition that the art
reflect majoritarian values. Indisputably, this is contrary not only
to the ideals of the First Amendment, but also the very purpose of
the NEA which is to encourage freedom of expression. Furthermore, government has declared its intent to "encourage a diversity
of views from private speakers." 9 9 Denial of a grant, pursuant to
standards requiring the agency to consider general standards of
decency and respect for American beliefs is not only punitive, but
also a product of individious viewpoint discrimination. 10 0 In prac93. Finley, 100 F.3d at 676 n. 7.
94. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2180.
95. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2717 (1972).
96. See Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173 (1991), Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 951(7) (1965).
98. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
99. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
100. For example, the provision as applied to the "NEA 4" would result in
discrimination against the non-traditional ideology of homosexuality, feminine
sexuality and racism and furthermore undercut the very purpose of the NEA, to
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tice, the language coupled with legislative history, allows the NEA
"to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective
criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints." 10 1 The standard
set forth by § 954(d)(1) is manufactured in such a way, cloaked as
merely hortatory, to withstand a facial attack. However, the
existence of the statute will inevitably have a chilling effect on
freedom of expression that can only be proved when courts consider the statute "as-applied" to a particular artist.
Furthermore, a substantial constitutional issue arises
because application of §954(d)(1) in granting-making decisions
will unduly burden artists expressing non-traditional and provocative ideas so as to eliminate them wholly from the artistic marketplace.' 0 2 The goals of the NEA are, among other things, to
promote the availability of the arts and to stimulate private support for the arts. The President's Committee on the Arts and
Humanities stated in a 1997 report, that the NEA provides the
largest source of funds for the arts available today. 0 3 Once an
artist receives approval from the NEA, many doors open in the
private sector that provide the artist with many financial and
exhibit opportunities. Financial obstacles resulting from the
application of the "decency and respect" clause will be similar to
the chilling effects caused by the certification provisions once
required by the NEA.10 4 In Bella, the court agreed that grant
applicants rely on funding from the NEA well beyond the dollar
value of a particular grant.'0 5 Moreover, "NEA grants lend prestige and legitimacy to projects and are therefore critical to the
ability of artists and companies to attract non-federal funding
sources.""0 6 The court held that the NEA's influential role in the
arts community meant that, "if an artist chooses not to be bound
by the NEA's obscenity restriction, he will not be able to obtain
private funding, and therefore, will be worse off than if he had not
applied for an NEA grant at all. This is the type of obstacle in the
path of the exercise of fundamental speech rights that the constiutilize art for experimentation not only in a creative sense, but also cultural
educational sense.
101. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2178.
102. Id. at 2179, citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
103. See Respondents' Brief at 2, Finley (No. 97-371).
104. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F.Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
105. Id. at 782.
106. Id. at 783.
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tution will not tolerate." °7 Similarly, by imposing a financial
obstacle in the pursuit to exercise freedom of expression, the
"decency and respect" clause will be detrimental to innovative and
experimental art. Although the Court in Finley noted that content-based considerations are a consequence of arts funding, it
previously held, "a statute is presumptively inconsistent with the
First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech."' 0 8 The decency clause will
place intolerable burdens on art that cultivates ideas and poses
questions. Whether indecent or not, such art defines American
culture.
The "decency and respect" clause, when applied to whom it is
relevant, is unconstitutional. The decency clause is inapplicable
when making funding decisions concerning symphony orchestras
or educational programs. Educational programs are already guaranteed factors of decency, there is no need for it to be "considered"
any further. Legislative history clearly indicates that the sole
motivation for the decency clause was to eliminate art projects
considered by Congress as "indecent" or "sacrilegious. " 10 9 The
decency clause is only relevant in considering art such as the
respondents.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

In response to a facial challenge, the Supreme Court's opinion
in Finley was correct. However application of the "decency and
respect" provision will compromise the very purpose of the NEA;
to promote artistic excellence.
Reliance on a facial challenge to establish the unconstitutionality of the "decency and respect" clause was procedurally, a
wrong move. Advisory language guiding discretionary decisions is
susceptible to a constitutional challenge once it has been implemented. Since the provision may be implemented in many different ways, the problem can only be addressed as it arises. The
decision making process of what art to subsidize must be structured to provide insulation from governmental control; however
application of the "decency and respect" standards runs the risks
of transforming art into government propaganda.
107. Id. at 785.
108. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115, (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 447 (1991)).

109. See Respondents' Brief at 3, Finley (No. 97-371).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss1/7
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The arts are "at the core of a democratic society's cultural and
political vitality."110 ih legislation accompanying the enactment
of the NEA, Congress recognized art as a repository of freedom.11 1
The Senate emphasized that freedom of artistic expression was to
be given "the fullest attention" and that "conformity for its own
sake is not to be
encouraged, and .. . no undue preference should be given to
any particular style or school of thought or expression."12 Contrary to this legislative intent, Justice O'Connor writing for the
majority in Finley stated, "as a practical matter, that artists may
conform their speech to what they believe to be the decision-making criteria in order to acquire funding. "113 Even though the
words of the Court note otherwise, it is hard to image that one of
America's repositories of freedom will be set aside when the choice
of what to subsidize is at hand.
Gloria F. Taft

110. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F.Supp 1457, 1473
(C.D.Cal. 1992).
111. S. Rep. No. 300, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
112. Id.
113. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2179.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998

17

